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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This report maps the possible implications of Brexit for environmental protection in Scotland, 
identifying core questions as well as solutions that may be adopted, with the objective of 
initiating a conversation about this complex subject matter. The report has been prepared as a 
joint endeavour by a group of environmental law experts based at Scottish Universities. Each 
section was drafted by a lead author, with inputs from the rest of the group. The paper is meant 
for a broad audience and intentionally uses a non-technical writing style.  
The paper is divided in two sections. The first section addresses cross-cutting questions 
affecting environmental governance after Brexit, focusing on the main Brexit scenarios and their 
trade, competition, and law enforcement implications. This analysis identifies a series of 
common challenges for environmental law in Scotland after Brexit, which relate to:  
• Loss of scrutiny and enforcement powers associated with the operation of EU law and 
institutions; 
• Loss of long-term policy horizon and of the stable regulatory framework provided by EU 
law; 
• Repositioning of the UK and Scotland in international and regional environmental 
governance cooperation; and 
• Restriction/loss of access to EU funds and programmes. 
The second section analyses specific questions likely to emerge in selected areas of 
environmental law, distinguishing between different types of EU environmental legislation and 
the related allocation of competences within the UK. The transposition of EU environmental law 
into domestic law takes place in different ways. Some pieces of EU environmental law have 
been transposed into UK/Scottish law and configure distinctively UK/Scottish solutions. After 
Brexit, retaining these pieces of legislation is going to be relatively straightforward. Other pieces 
of EU environmental law, conversely, heavily rely upon EU processes and institutions and will no 
longer be applicable in their present form after Brexit. On these matters, EU powers and 
competences will be repatriated, raising fundamental questions concerning the allocation of 
powers between the UK’s central and devolved administrations. Finally, EU membership has 
important implications concerning the UK’s implementation of international obligations in areas 
such as climate change law or air pollution. In these areas, EU law is often more ambitious than 
the underlying international obligations. Brexit will therefore confront the UK and devolved 
administrations with fundamental choices regarding how to continue to comply with 
international obligations, and maintain and enhance their current level of commitment and 
ambition over time. 
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1 CROSSCUTTING ISSUES 
This section addresses cross-cutting questions affecting environmental governance after Brexit, 
focusing on the main Brexit scenarios and their trade, competition, and law enforcement 
implications. 
1.1 Brexit scenarios (Annalisa Savaresi)  
Even if the UK Government has on several occasions reiterated that ‘Brexit means Brexit’, this 
oracular statement sheds little light on the future relationship of the UK with the EU. Two main 
scenarios may be envisaged.  
Under the first scenario, the UK would remain closely linked to the EU, for example as part of 
the European Economic Area (EEA), presently composed of Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. 
These States are not EU Members, but nevertheless enjoy some of the privileges associated with 
EU membership, including preferential access to the Single European Market. As a condition of 
access, they are subjected to most EU law, some enforcement procedures, and also provide 
bilaterally negotiated financial contributions to the EU. Research institutions in EEA States can 
access EU cooperation funds to varying degrees. The EEA Agreement does not cover the 
Common Agriculture and Fisheries Policies or nature conservation measures, but addresses 
aspects of trade in agricultural and fish products, as well as invasive species. As an EEA member, 
therefore, the UK would still be obliged to abide by EU environmental laws on numerous issues. 
Even when not obliged to do so, the UK could decide to act jointly with EU Member States, as 
other EEA members presently do in relation for example to climate change.  
Under the second scenario, the UK would be outside both the EU and the EEA. Even then, the 
UK would be under pressure to align with some EU environmental standards concerning issues 
such as agricultural products and chemicals, in order to trade with EU member States. This is 
well exemplified by the case of Switzerland. Switzerland has a vast series of bilateral 
agreements with the EU and is part of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which 
provides for free trade with the EU in all non-agricultural goods. As a result of these 
arrangements, Switzerland’s environmental legislation has been progressively aligned with that 
of the EU in a number of sectors, for example in relation to aircraft noise emissions and 
agricultural products. Moreover, Switzerland has independently adopted elements of EU law in 
areas not covered by bilateral accords to avoid trade barriers. Therefore, even in this scenario, 
continued alignment with EU environmental law would be necessary at least in areas that are 
closely associated with access to the EU market. In other areas, there would be less of an 
incentive for the UK to align with EU standards. While the UK would continue to be bound by its 
present international law obligations on environmental matters, it would no longer be bound by 
the EU’s approach to implementing these. The matter of access to EU research cooperation, 
funding and partnerships would also have to be negotiated anew. 
Little is known about how and to what extent the UK plans to cut loose from EU environmental 
law. What seems certain is that decisions will have to be made about who will assume the 
competences presently exercised by the EU. Environmental protection is one of the devolved 
competences of the Scottish Parliament. However, whether EU powers will by default go to the 
Scottish Parliament and other devolved administrations, or will be re-reserved to Westminster is 
yet to be seen. 
From the perspective of Scotland, it would not seem possible to seek independent EU 
membership under present constitutional arrangements. Scotland could however seek further 
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devolved powers, including the capacity to conclude international agreements on matters 
within its competence, such as environmental protection. For example, Scotland could seek 
powers akin to those bestowed upon the Governments of the Faroe Islands and Greenland to 
negotiate and conclude international agreements with foreign states and international 
organisations that entirely relate to their fields of responsibility. This arrangement could be 
specifically beneficial to address international and regional cooperation on matters related, for 
example, to protected areas and fisheries. Another, less formal, way for Scotland to continue 
engaging with EU Member States and institutions is through autonomous membership of 
regional and networks and institutions working on issues such as energy, fisheries and 
environmental law enforcement. 
1.2 Law enforcement implications (Antonio Cardesa-Salzmann and Annalisa Savaresi)  
Enforcement of EU law rests on two pillars. The first consists in the supervisory powers of the EU 
Commission vis-à-vis Member States and, to a lesser extent, also members of the public. If the 
Commission identifies issues of compliance with EU law in a Member State, it has the power to 
bring the said Member State before the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). If found to be in 
breach, the Member State can be asked to pay fines until the compliance issue has been 
resolved. Members of the public can informally raise concerns over the implementation of EU 
law with the Commission, but the latter has ample discretion on whether or not to initiate 
enforcement proceedings. The Commission exercises its far-reaching enforcement powers with 
some restraint. In the case of the UK the Commission has exercised its enforcement powers in 
relation to nature protection, waste (landfills and packaging wastes), waste water collection and 
treatment, and air quality standards.   
The second, and most important, pillar of EU law enforcement relies on the Member States 
themselves. Members of the public and pressure groups can initiate legal action before Member 
State courts to request compliance with EU law, as exemplified by recent litigation concerning 
air pollution in the UK. In these instances, the CJEU plays a complementary role in assisting 
national courts in the interpretation of EU law.  
With Brexit, these enforcement mechanisms will cease to apply to the UK. Should the UK decide 
to remain in the EEA, some residual enforcement procedures would still exist. Under other 
Brexit scenarios, the EU law’s hard enforcement edge would be lost. Brexit will therefore entail 
the loss of a powerful means of scrutiny over how the UK manages its environment, with no 
obvious replacement for it. Instead, UK citizens will only be able to access national courts to 
complain about breaches of domestic environmental law. After Brexit, both Scotland and the UK 
could explore new avenues to ensure better law enforcement, such as the establishment of a 
dedicated environmental court, and/or an environmental ombudsman.  
After Brexit Scotland could also explore avenues to informally partner up with the EU 
Commission’s services and Member States, for example, by seeking an autonomous role in the 
European Union Network for the Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental Law 
(IMPEL). IMPEL gathers together European regulators and environmental authorities of EU 
Member States, acceding and candidate countries, as well as EEA countries. The network 
supports the practicability and enforceability of environmental law through the exchange of 
information and experiences, as well as capacity-building on the implementation, enforcement 
and international enforcement collaborations. It does so through problem-focused projects in 
thematic areas such as industry and air, waste and transfrontier shipments, water and land, 
nature protection, and cross-cutting tools and approaches. The Scottish Environmental 
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Protection Agency (SEPA) is already a member of IMPEL. Continuous involvement in IMPEL after 
Brexit could enable Scotland to continue engaging in European environmental governance, and 
aligning with EU environmental regulations and policies on devolved matters. The second 
section of the paper identifies specific areas where continued engagement with IMPEL may be 
desirable. 
1.3 Trade and competition implications (Stephanie Switzer and Malcolm Combe) 
The EU exercises its Member States’ rights and assumes responsibility for the performance of 
their obligations under the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The UK is a WTO member in its 
own right and will remain so upon withdrawing from the EU. So whilst the UK’s WTO 
commitments are currently tied with those of the EU, post-Brexit the UK will remain bound by 
the broad range of substantive obligations arising from the full gamut of so-called ‘covered 
agreements’ under WTO law only in its own right.  
WTO membership not only requires adherence to the general corpus of WTO law but also 
entails member-specific commitments on, inter alia, market access and agricultural subsidies. 
These are contained in individual ‘Schedules of Concessions’. Questions have been raised over 
the UK’s ability to grant agricultural subsidies after Brexit. It cannot be assumed that a simple 
pro rata disaggregation of agricultural domestic support commitments based on the existing 
commitments in the EU Schedule of Concessions would be acceptable to the WTO membership. 
It should, however, be noted that the actual rate of trade distorting agricultural domestic 
support granted by the EU is significantly below its bound limits. Accordingly, apportionment of 
actual rather than bound subsidy levels may be less controversial, but it cannot be assumed this 
will be a straightforward process to negotiate. At the same time, certain forms of domestic 
agricultural support are currently exempt from bound commitments and are hence unlikely to 
be problematic. These include subsidies which are de minimis, as well as so-called ‘green box’ 
subsidies – i.e. agricultural subsidies which do ‘not distort trade, or at most cause minimal 
distortion’ and which include, among other things, decoupled income support and certain 
payments for environmental programmes. So-called ‘blue box’ subsidies are also not currently 
subject to a cap within the WTO and provide legal cover to payments for production limiting 
programmes.  
Most domestic support provided under the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is green box. 
Equally, most of Scotland’s existing agricultural subsidies used to effect environmental ends are 
likely to be green box. Consequently, post-Brexit the continuation of the likes of the existing 
agri-environment climate scheme would be possible to the extent such support is recognised as 
green box. More generally, while a return to unfettered use of trade distorting agricultural 
subsidies is unlikely, post-Brexit there will be scope for targeted agricultural support to be used 
to achieve environmental ends, so long as the law of the WTO is adhered to.  
One area of Scottish environmental law where the implications of EU law have been evident is 
land reform. Since devolution, Scotland has introduced a number of major reforms to its land 
laws. While EU law did not influence these reforms, the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2016 was 
informed by EU provisions on free movement of capital and state aid. For example, a 
recommendation to improve transparency of landownership to the effect that land should only 
be capable of ownership by entities registered in an EU Member State was not brought forward 
for fear of legal challenge, as the relevant provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union on free movement of capital also apply to trade between Member States and 
third countries. Other land reform measures aiding the acquisition of assets by communities, 
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perhaps from a public body transferring at undervalue, also have had to skate around rules 
relating to state aid. The impact of Brexit on this legislation is nevertheless likely to be small. 
While Brexit would release the UK from certain EU state aid or free movement rules, there are 
other rules at international/WTO level that could apply. 
2 TYPES OF EU ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION AND COMPETENCE ALLOCATION (Apolline 
Roger)  
This section analyses specific questions likely to emerge in selected areas of environmental law, 
distinguishing between different types of EU environmental legislation and the related 
allocation of competences within the UK. With Brexit, the UK will re-acquire law-making powers 
on environmental matters that are presently within the remit of the EU. These powers are wide-
ranging, and cover subjects as diverse as agriculture, air quality, chemicals, climate change, 
fisheries, protected areas and waste. The approach of EU law to regulating these matters varies 
greatly. Some areas are heavily centralised, vesting a great deal of control in the EU, such as 
chemical regulations. In others, EU legislation simply sets targets, for example in relation to 
renewable energy usage, leaving Member States considerable discretion over how to achieve 
them.  
In this regard, EU legislation can be divided into five types: 1) nature protection; 2) citizens’ 
environmental rights; 3) regulation of activities; 4) regulation of products; and 5) repartition of 
common resources (Table 1).  
Legislation types 1, 2 and 3 generally set compulsory objectives for Member States, leaving 
them discretion in deciding how to comply. The implementation of this legislation tends to be 
decentralized. In the UK, areas of environmental law that can be ascribed to type 1, 2 and 3 
correspond to matters that are either entirely devolved or where there are varying degrees of 
cooperation between Westminster and the devolved administrations. Post-Brexit, the 
repatriation of competences presently exercised by the EU will entail decisions as to who is in 
charge of what was previously determined at EU level, such as objectives, timelines and general 
policy frameworks. For the authorities receiving these new tasks, it might be necessary to 
develop new administrative capacity in some areas, such as agriculture. 
Legislation type 4 applies directly, mostly without any discretion left to the Member States. 
Presently, as norms concerning the regulation of products affect the internal market, their 
implementation falls within Westminster’s reserved trade competence. Post-Brexit, the 
allocation of competence between Westminster and the devolved administrations may continue 
to follow this model. However, the regulation of products has considerable environmental 
impacts and, accordingly, affects the exercise of the environmental competence of devolved 
administrations. Therefore, post-Brexit, these areas might either be devolved or subject to 
greater cooperation between Westminster and the devolved administrations.  
Legislation type 5 concerns the management and exploitation of common resources, such as 
fisheries, and requires close cooperation between Member States. While leaving some margin 
of discretion to Member States, this type of legislation is largely centralised at EU level. Post-
Brexit, the repatriation of EU competences will require deciding on their re-allocation between 
central or devolved administrations. Equally, the degree of cooperation with the EU and its 
Member States will have to be re-considered. 
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The next sections analyse the implications of Brexit in various areas of environmental law, using 
the typology above to shed light on the characteristics of EU law, and the likely repercussions of 
the repatriation of EU powers in each area. 
 
Table 1: Types of EU environmental legislation and how they relate to internal competences within Member States  
2.1 Habitats and birds (Antonio Cardesa-Salzmann) 
EU law has been a key driver of biodiversity protection in the UK, with the enactment of 
regulations and directives on protected areas and species [Habitats Directive (92/43/EEC)], 
especially concerning wild birds [Wild Birds Directive (2009/147/EC)]. These instruments 
broadly fall within EU legislation type 1, but do grant rather pervasive powers to the EU 
Commission on the management of Natura 2000 or Habitats sites, concerning e.g. the 
authorisation of plans or projects with negative effects on some priority protected habitats and 
species. The implementation of the Habitats and Wild Birds Directives falls within the remit of 
devolved administrations, except for reserved matters covered by the Conservation of Habitats 
and Species Regulations 2010, the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 and the Conservation 
(Natural Habitats, etc.) Regulations 1994. In the past the UK was brought before the CJEU for 
non-compliance with the Habitats Directive, amongst others, with respect to offshore oil and 
gas activities and the failure to implement it beyond its territorial waters [CJEU (case C-6/04)]. 
  Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Type 5 
 Aim Nature 
Protection  
Citizens’ 
environmental 
rights 
Regulation of 
activities 
Regulation of 
products 
Repartition of 
Common 
resources 
Internal 
Competence 
Concerned 
Environment 
and Land  
Administrative 
law, Judiciary, 
and 
Environment 
Land, 
Agriculture 
and 
Environment 
Trade and 
Environment 
Agriculture, 
Fisheries, Trade 
and 
Environment 
Mainly devolved Trade reserved but close links 
with devolved competences 
Examples of 
EU legislation 
Water 
pollution 
Habitats 
Birds 
  
Access to justice 
and information 
Participation in 
environmental 
decision-making 
Impact 
assessment 
Waste 
Industrial 
emissions 
Renewable 
energy 
CO2 
emissions 
from cars 
Waste 
Energy 
efficiency  
Chemicals  
Emission trading 
scheme 
Common 
Agriculture 
Policy 
Common 
Fisheries Policy 
Degree of 
Centralisation 
Mainly decentralised 
 
Mainly centralised 
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Brexit may affect the way in which the UK and Scotland conserve and sustainably use 
biodiversity. As the EEA Agreement excludes the Habitats and Wild Birds Directives from its 
scope of application, this is an area of EU law that will cease to apply, regardless of the specific 
way in which the UK leaves the EU. Losing the EU law’s enforcement edge and the EU 
Commission’s oversight of the most important conservation sites may be especially problematic 
in this sector. The same may be said in relation to access to the LIFE programme, which 
supports the implementation, updating and development of EU environmental and climate 
policy and legislation. Post Brexit, therefore, Scotland has a strong interest in the devolution of 
powers regarding protected areas and species protection, especially in the context of the re-
allocation of powers currently exercised by the EU Commission for the management of Natura 
2000 sites under the guidance of the Habitats Committee. If the UK re-reserved that power, 
there might be a lowering of standards regarding the designation of protected areas.  
2.2 Trade in endangered species and wildlife crime (Colin Reid and Antonio Cardesa-Salzmann) 
EU law restricts international trade in endangered species of flora and fauna and combats 
transnational wildlife crime. In international law these matters are addressed in the Convention 
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES), which identifies 
the species subjected to varying levels of trading restrictions and imposes requirements for 
licences for import and export. In the EU CITES is implemented by means of the Wildlife 
Protection Regulation (338/97), a piece of type 4 legislation which goes significantly beyond 
CITES requirements. In the UK compliance with CITES obligations is achieved through legislation 
implementing EU law [Control of Trade in Endangered Species (Enforcement) Regulations 1997 
(SI 1997/132)], but the details of species covered by licences and the circumstances in which 
these can be issued are detailed in EU law. After Brexit, either these regulations will remain 
incorporated in UK legislation, or equivalent legislation will have to be enacted, raising questions 
over the internal allocation of competences on trade-related responsibilities. 
EU law also addresses the issue of transnational wildlife crime, defining environmentally harmful 
conducts to be enacted as criminal offences by Member States [Environmental Crime Directive 
(2008/99/EC)]. These include trade in specimens of protected wild fauna or flora species, as well 
as conducts causing a significant deterioration of habitats within protected sites. In the UK and 
in Scotland, EU law was transposed into domestic law by the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, 
the Criminal Law Act 1977 and the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. After Brexit, the 
Environmental Crime Directive would remain applicable if the UK opted for remaining in the 
EEA. Otherwise, the UK would only be bound by lower CITES standards and monitoring 
procedures, which would be de-coupled from EU law and its enforcement mechanisms. This is 
an area where current levels of protection could be maintained through capacity building and 
homologation of practices by joining IMPEL-led projects, such as, for example, the recent 
initiative concerning implementation and enforcement of the EU Timber Regulation.  
2.3 Water (Francesco Sindico) 
The Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) is the main piece of EU legislation on water. This 
type 1 piece of EU legislation establishes an all-encompassing legal framework for the protection 
of inland surface, transitional, coastal and ground waters. The Directive aims to deliver the 
protection and good management of freshwaters through the establishment of river basin 
management plans and protected areas. Other important pieces of legislation are the Bathing 
Water Directive (2006/7/EC) and the Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive (91/271/EEC). 
Like other areas of EU environmental law, these Directives provide a floor rather than a ceiling, 
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allowing Member States to develop more stringent rules and standards. This is an area in which 
EU law and institutions have made a clear difference, pushing UK authorities to significantly 
improve their record. 
Water regulation and management are devolved matters in the UK. As a result, Scotland has full 
competence in implementing the Water Framework Directive and has done so by passing the 
Water Environment and Water Services (Scotland) Act 2003. Implementation is mostly carried 
out by the Scottish Environment Protection Agency, which develops river basin management 
plans. The Scottish Government has committed to push forward a ‘Hydro Nation’ agenda, which 
envisions Scotland as a hub of excellence in water management. 
Because of the devolved nature of freshwater management, Brexit is not expected to have 
immediate consequences in this sector. Scotland will therefore be able to carry on with its 
current water legislation and policies. Due to the critical role of water for Scottish industries, like 
the whisky and the shellfish sectors, it would seem important not relax current water standards 
and policies. The extent to which Scottish Water, the publicly owned company that controls 
access to water, will change its policies after Brexit depends on financial and economic 
considerations, rather than legal ones. Another potential implication of Brexit relates to cross-
border arrangements for the Tweed and Solway. While presently these arrangements align with 
EU standards, they may become more contentious, should Scotland and England’s approach to 
water management significantly diverge in future. In this context, Scotland would likely benefit 
from continued involvement in the IMPEL network and its capacity-building and best practice 
exchanges on water and land. 
2.4 Air quality (Annalisa Savaresi) 
EU law regulates various sources of air pollution, including large and medium combustion plants 
and road and marine transport; and sets air quality standards that regulate cumulative pollution 
(most saliently, through the Ambient Air Quality and Clean Air Directive 2008/50/EC), as well as 
caps on national emissions through emissions ceilings (National Emission Ceilings Directive 
2001/81/EC). EU law on air quality is therefore characterised by the coexistence of EU legislation 
types 1, 3 and 4. EU law implements a host of regional and international instruments on 
transboundary air and atmospheric pollution, chemicals regulation and the dumping of 
hazardous waste, often going beyond the obligations enshrined in these. 
The implementation of EU law has resulted in improvements in air quality across Europe. 
However, urban air quality in the UK has fallen below EU standards in relation to some 
pollutants, triggering the exercise of enforcement action by the EU Commission. As a result, the 
UK has been asked to prepare and implement an Air Quality Plan. This matter has been the 
subject of a judicial saga that recently saw the High Court quashing the UK plan as inadequate to 
ensuring compliance with the Directive 2008/50/EC [ClientEarth (No.2) v Secretary of State for 
the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2016] EWHC 2740 (Admin)].  
Within the UK, air quality is a devolved matter and the Scottish Government is responsible for 
developing policies and legislation to improve air quality and reduce risks to human health in 
Scotland. These powers have been exercised by means of the adoption of various iterations of 
air quality regulations [Air Quality (Scotland) Regulations 2000, and 2002 and 2016 
Amendments], which have seen Scotland adopting more stringent objectives for some 
pollutants than the rest of the UK. Local authorities are responsible for reviewing the quality of 
air and for assessing achievement of the objectives identified by the regulations. However, they 
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are only required to demonstrate that they are doing all that is reasonably possible in order to 
achieve the objectives. Data published by the Scottish Government shows that air pollution 
objectives are not being met at numerous locations, including all major Scottish cities. 
Given the prominent role of EU law in setting air pollution standards, and the failure of UK and 
Scottish authorities to comply with them, Brexit may have a significant impact in this area. In the 
absence of EU law obligations, both Scottish and UK authorities may relax their standards on air 
quality, insofar as compatible with the UK’s international obligations on this issue. The same 
may happen when UK authorities find themselves faced with competing objectives, such as 
expansion of airport capacity, without the EU Commission watching over their shoulder. Due to 
the integrated nature of the problem and the demise of the EU’s centralised standard-setting 
and enforcement roles, coordination amongst central and devolved authorities in the exercise of 
regulatory powers over air pollution will likely need to intensify after Brexit. The role of public 
scrutiny by means of access to information and litigation may equally need to be safeguarded 
and strengthened. Conversely, in other areas, like emission standards for vehicles, both the UK 
and Scotland would remain under considerable pressure to comply with EU standards in order 
to continue exporting into the EU market. 
2.5 Procedural rights (Colin Reid) 
The public right of access to environmental information held by public authorities was 
established in EU law in the early 1990s (Directive 90/313/EEC). This and subsequent EU law 
instruments can be categorised as type 2 legislation, and generally set compulsory objectives for 
Member States, leaving them discretion in deciding how to comply. In Scotland, the Freedom of 
Information (Scotland) Act 2002 and the Environmental Information (Scotland) Regulations 2004 
(SSI 2004/520) provide separate regimes for access to environmental information, implementing 
EU law requirements.  
EU law has introduced much greater transparency in many regulatory regimes, notably through 
the establishment of public registers recording applications, permits and enforcement action. 
This is in addition to the specific right of members of the public under the 2004 Regulations to 
request environmental information from public authorities with only limited grounds on which it 
can be withheld. 
Brexit will remove the need for the Scottish regulations to comply with the relevant EU law, 
allowing adjustments to the scope of the information covered, the bodies bound by the 
requirement to provide information, the timescale for responses, the charging regimes and the 
exceptions which allow requests for information to be refused. 
International obligations are however especially relevant in this regard. The UK is party to the 
1998 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access 
to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention), which imposes obligations on access 
to environmental information very similar to those in current EU law. The Convention’s 
compliance mechanism can hear complaints from individuals or groups and determine whether 
or not a state has complied with its obligations. The determinations of the Compliance 
Committee do not have legal force in domestic law, but can be a source of embarrassment to 
the government and have been referred to by UK courts (e.g. Walton v Scottish Ministers [2012] 
UKSC 44 at [100]). 
In addition to providing for public access to environmental information, the Aarhus Convention 
requires states to ensure that individuals and NGOs are able to participate in environmental 
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decision-making and have access to means of challenging the legality of many decisions made 
by public authorities on environmental matters. This obligation has been partially implemented 
in EU law (Directive 2003/35/EC), so that compliance with the Convention’s obligations can in 
some circumstances be not only tested through the Aarhus Compliance Committee but also 
enforced as a matter of EU law.  
Significant elements of the Aarhus provisions are the need to ensure wide standing to bring legal 
cases, notably for NGOs, and that legal proceedings are not prohibitively expensive. The former 
should no longer be an issue in Scotland following the Supreme Court’s relaxation of the rules 
on standing in recent years, particularly in environmental cases. The latter remains a live issue, 
with the need to comply with EU law on this point leading to the introduction of a specific 
regime for Protective Expenses Orders in environmental cases (Rules of the Court of Session, 
Chapter 58A). Initially this was only for those categories of cases covered by the EU measures 
that gave effect to the Aarhus requirements in certain areas, but more recently this has been 
extended to provide coverage that is broader, although possibly still not covering the full width 
of the Aarhus obligations.  
One of the main risks arising from Brexit is losing the hard, enforceable edge that EU law 
provides to the Aarhus Convention’s provisions, and the potential lowering of standards in the 
domestic implementation of the Aarhus Convention if changes are made to existing legislation 
implementing EU law.  
2.6 Environmental assessment (Colin Reid) 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of individual projects, such as a dams, motorways, or 
major industrial developments, and Strategic Environmental Assessment of plans and strategies 
(SEA) were introduced in the UK as a result of successive iterations of the EIA Directive (notably, 
85/337/EEC, 2011/92/EU and 2014/52/EU) and the SEA Directive 2001/42/EC.  
As pieces of type 3 legislation, these instruments set objectives for Member States, leaving them 
discretion in deciding how to comply. Under present constitutional arrangements, 
implementation of these Directives in Scotland is encompassed, for EIA, in the Town and 
Country Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) (Scotland) Regulations 2011 (SSI 
2011/139) and parallel regulations for other forms of project; for SEA, in the Environmental 
Assessment (Scotland) Act 2005. The Scottish legislation contains occasional references to EU 
measures in setting the scope of certain provisions, but will essentially be able to continue 
unaffected by any change in the status of EU law. Scotland has chosen to go beyond EU law in 
the 2005 Act, which embodies a distinct policy choice in applying SEA to all public sector plans, 
not just to those in the specific categories identified in EU law as requiring this process, whereas 
the law in the rest of the UK is limited to the scope of the EU rules. 
Although withdrawal from the EU will leave Scotland with the option of removing the 
requirement for environmental assessment, such a radical step seems unlikely. EIA is such a 
widespread practice in environmental management worldwide that it is now regarded as part of 
customary international law, at least in the transboundary context. The UK is also subjected to 
specific EIA requirements as a result of its obligations under the 1991 Convention on 
Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context. The European Court of Human 
Rights has furthermore suggested that states need to undertake some such assessment to fulfil 
their obligations to protect the rights of citizens at risk for environmentally harmful activities 
(Taskin v Turkey, (2006) 42 EHRR 50). Yet, withdrawal from the EU will open the way to the 
freedom to adjust the scope of the projects and strategies requiring an assessment and the 
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details of the procedure to be followed, since the law will no longer have to satisfy the relevant 
EU Directives which set out both in considerable detail. The potential to be more demanding 
than the Directives has been demonstrated by the 2005 Act: there will now be the potential to 
be less demanding. 
2.7 Energy (Aileen McHarg) 
The Scottish Government has strong energy policy ambitions, particularly regarding the 
promotion of low carbon energy, but relatively weak energy policy competence, making it 
vulnerable to decisions taken at UK level which conflict with its policy objectives.  This was 
illustrated in 2015, when the newly-elected Conservative Government withdrew subsidies from 
onshore windfarms, cancelled funding for carbon capture and storage demonstration projects, 
and ended energy efficiency programmes.   
In this context, EU law has been a valuable support for the Scottish Government’s energy goals.  
EU energy law broadly falls within legislation types 3 and 4. EU renewables targets have been a 
key driver behind the expansion of renewable energy in the UK, providing long-term policy 
stability and thereby increasing investor confidence, as well as requiring the UK Government to 
provide greater support for the renewables sector than it may otherwise have done. Similarly, 
EU legislation has been important in promoting energy efficiency, for instance via energy 
labelling, building energy performance assessment, and product standards.  
EU membership also gives access to funding for research, development and demonstration of 
low carbon energy technologies and investment in energy infrastructure. Scottish businesses 
and universities have benefitted considerably from such funding, which may no longer be 
available post-Brexit. Brexit therefore increases the political risk of investing in low carbon 
energy, and is likely to create a more challenging economic climate, making it harder for the 
Scottish Government to achieve its policy aims.   
A further benefit of EU membership is increasing integration of Member States’ energy systems, 
pursuant to plans to achieve an EU ‘Energy Union’. In order fully to exploit its renewable energy 
potential, Scotland needs to be able to export excess production, as well as to import electricity 
to keep the system running at times when intermittent renewables, such as wind, are not 
generating. The Scottish Government is therefore keen to secure greater integration with other 
European energy systems, for instance through the construction of a North Sea energy grid. This 
has been identified as a project of common European interest under the Trans-European 
Network programme, again benefitting from European funding and regulatory co-ordination. 
Maintaining close relations with the EU on energy matters and gaining greater competence over 
energy policy are therefore likely to be high priorities for the Scottish Government.   
It is not essential to be in the EU in order to integrate energy systems. For instance, Norway, as 
an EEA Member, participates in the Internal Energy Market. However, EU membership does 
make integration easier, and since the Scottish Government currently has no international legal 
capacity, its ability to secure international cooperation by itself is greatly limited.  
There may, of course, also be some benefits to EU withdrawal. The UK and Scotland would no 
longer be bound by EU free movement rules, competition law, state aid law, public procurement 
rules or VAT law, which constrain both the structure and regulation of energy markets, although 
it seems likely that competition and state aid rules at least will be replicated in any post-Brexit 
deal. In addition, subject to the UK’s international commitments, the Scottish Parliament would 
gain the freedom to reform environmental legislation that restricts the development and 
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operation of energy facilities, such as the Habitats Directive, the Wild Birds Directive and the 
Industrial Emissions Directive.  
2.8 Noise (Antonio Cardesa-Salzmann) 
Noise is an area of environmental law where much legislation does not derive from EU law. 
However, the EU’s influence in this area has grown, particularly through type 3 and 4 legislation. 
EU-derived product standards address noise and the Industrial Emissions Directive regulates 
noise, amongst other things (Directive 2010/75/EU). The Environmental Noise Directive 
(2002/49/EC) identifies a common approach to reduce the harmful effects on health of the 
exposure of populations to environmental noise by mapping noise-sources. These standards are 
relevant for international commitments and obligations under the World Health Organisation 
and international human rights law, such as the right to respect for the home and private life 
(article 8 ECHR) and rights of access to information and participation in environmental decision-
making under the Aarhus Convention.    
Implementation of the Environmental Noise Directive in the UK is a devolved matter, except for 
regulations implementing directives on product-specific (motor vehicles and outdoor 
equipment) or activity-specific (airports) noise standards. Under the Environmental Noise 
(Scotland) Regulations 2006, two noise-mapping exercises have been commissioned, and 
Strategic Noise Action Plans for particularly exposed Scottish cities and sites have been adopted. 
The implementation of EU legislation on the regulation of activities pursuant to the Noise and 
the Industrial Emissions Directives are largely devolved matters. Accordingly, any decision on 
the continuing application of current standards and procedures rests with Holyrood. However, 
after Brexit clashes might arise between the approach to product standards taken by the 
Scottish Parliament and that taken by the UK Parliament.  
2.9 Waste (Antonio Cardesa-Salzmann) 
EU law has decisively shaped waste legislation across the UK. Since the adoption of the first EU-
wide measures in this area in 1975, waste management in the UK has moved from landfilling all 
urban waste, to a regime of waste selection, recycling and treatment. This process has 
encountered numerous difficulties and obstacles. The CJEU found the UK to be lagging behind in 
the adoption of required standards especially on landfills and packaging waste. Despite enduring 
problems, the overall impact of EU law over waste treatment across the UK has been a positive 
one. Major difficulties with the implementation of waste legislation derive from its costliness, 
difficulty of enforcement, as well as the sheer complexity of legislation itself, as suggested by 
the ongoing saga of court cases relating to the definitions of terms used in waste legislation. EU 
law broadly aligns with and goes beyond the UK’s international obligations regarding 
transboundary movements of hazardous wastes under the 1989 Basel Convention on the 
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal. 
EU waste legislation encompasses both highly centralised type 4 legislation, as well as 
decentralised type 3 legislation. Within the UK, implementation of EU law is mostly within the 
remit of devolved administrations. Except for regulations on packaging waste, waste electrical 
and electronic equipment and port waste reception, waste management is a largely a devolved 
matter, which is governed by the Waste (Scotland) Regulations 2011, Waste Management 
Licensing (Scotland) Regulations 2011 and Waste (Recyclate Quality)(Scotland) Regulations 
2015.  
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Very much as in the context of air pollution, the main risks of Brexit for waste legislation would 
be to lose the oversight of EU institutions in an area where historically the UK has lagged 
behind EU standards, as well as a relaxation in regulatory standards. The UK and Scotland could 
simply decide that all EU waste legislation applicable before Brexit would continue applying. In 
the unlikely event that the UK should decide otherwise, it would be faced with challenging 
questions on the reform of current waste management standards. In this connection, IMPEL 
membership could be a particularly promising means for Scotland to remain engaged with EU 
projects and programmes devising best practices and for capacity-building in areas such as 
transfrontier shipments of waste, electronic and e-waste and landfills. 
2.10 Chemicals (Apolline Roger) 
The EU has adopted several pieces of legislation on chemicals, which are primarily trade 
regulations harmonising the conditions under which chemicals can be placed on the market, 
largely falling within the scope of legislation type 4. These regulations aim at protecting the 
environment, human health and animals. However, first and foremost, they aim at harmonising 
national laws to avoid the barriers to trade that differences between national chemical 
regulations would create. Because chemical legislations aim at promoting the free circulation of 
goods, they leave little or no margin of appreciation to Member States. In addition, they create 
EU procedures, institutions and systems of cooperation between the Member States. For 
example, the Regulation on the Registration, Evaluation, authorisation and restriction of 
chemicals (REACH) created the European Chemical Agency (ECHA) in charge of registering 
chemicals and planning their assessment. Such procedures and institutions cannot simply be 
incorporated into UK law.  Instead, an entirely new governance system would have to be 
recreated at national level. For example, current EU rules share the burden of conducting risk 
assessments amongst the Member States on e.g. biocidal products: the UK will have to consider 
how to carry the additional burden. EU chemical regulation also allocates administrative or 
scientific tasks to EU institutions that may not have an equivalent at the national level; e.g. for 
chemicals’ registration, evaluation, authorisation and restriction. Post-Brexit, therefore, the UK 
will have to develop new administrative capacity and scientific expertise to make up for gaps in 
chemical regulations. Given the complexity of the task and the global impact of EU chemicals 
norms on trade, however, the UK will be under pressure to continue to align with the EU system 
after Brexit. 
The internal allocation of regulatory powers over chemicals is also likely to be particularly 
sensitive. Chemical regulations are environmental and health norms with a direct impact on 
trade, agriculture and industry. In the UK, trade and health and safety are presently reserved 
matters, whereas the promotion of good health, environmental protection and agriculture are 
devolved matters. This overlap explains why Scotland has power to control the import and 
export of food additives (SA 1998, Order 2005, S.I. 2005/849), pesticides, herbicides, fertilisers 
and biocidal products (SA 1998, sch 5, pt II, s C5) but not all chemicals. 
2.11 Agriculture (Miranda Geelhoed) 
The EU’s legal regime on agriculture consists of an increasingly integrated patchwork of 
agricultural, food and environmental regulations. The regime includes rules for direct payments 
and rural development programmes under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), regulations 
to protect against risks associated with agro products, such as genetically modified organisms 
and plant protection products, and certification regimes for recognition of organic and quality 
produce. The regime is, furthermore, intrinsically linked to environmental laws to combat 
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pollution and protect biodiversity. Agriculture is an area where all five types of EU 
environmental legislation are at play. 
Agriculture and the environment are devolved matters in the UK. Presently, Scotland’s powers 
to regulate these fields are limited by the level of harmonisation prescribed by EU law. For 
example, the CAP allocates national payments and sets out some conditions for further 
redistribution of subsidies amongst farmers, falling within legislation type 5. Yet the CAP leaves 
considerable leeway to accommodate local environmental and societal needs, as exemplified by 
Scotland’s agri-environment, climate and crofting rural development schemes. Similarly, EU 
environmental laws applied to agriculture provide only for minimum harmonisation, thus 
allowing Scotland to set stricter ones. Only type 4 product risk regulation – a matter that directly 
touches upon free movement of goods – is in principle fully harmonised, thus limiting the scope 
for Member States’ discretion, although exceptions may apply.  
Brexit raises the question of whether the UK’s future legal framework on agriculture will be less, 
equally so or more supportive than the EU’s current regime towards Scotland’s regulatory 
ambitions to foster agro-environmental stewardship. Even as an EEA Member, the UK would no 
longer be in the CAP, which allocated £4 billion to Scotland for the period 2014-2020. The void 
left by the CAP creates opportunities for a less bureaucratic and greener British – or Scottish - 
Agricultural Policy, which is better tailored to Scottish needs and priorities. Yet, tools like 
targeted payments play a recognised role in enabling and enforcing sustainable agro-
environmental management. Post Brexit, Scotland’s environmental aspirations in this sector 
may be difficult to achieve, both due to the competitive advantage of subsidised farmers in the 
EU and of less-regulated famers elsewhere in the UK. Lastly, questions may arise regarding the 
division of powers within the UK on matters that are currently regulated by the EU. For example, 
the EU is presently in charge of assessing the environmental risks of genetically modified crops 
(GMOs), yet a two-tier risk-management system enables devolved administrations to prohibit 
the cultivation of GMOs on compelling socio-economic grounds. The shape and form of a future 
UK regime on GMOs is uncertain and depends on whether the authorisation procedure will be 
treated as primarily a trade (reserved) or environmental (devolved) matter. Stark differences 
between Scotland and the rest of the UK may surface, which may or may not leave space for 
derogations.  
The effective exercise of Scotland’s powers in the agro-environmental realm will therefore 
greatly depend on the continuity of legal and financial arrangements within the UK. 
2.12 Marine and fisheries (Mara Ntona) 
EU law has made a crucial contribution to the management of marine and coastal areas across 
the UK. This policy area is characterised by the intersection of instruments belonging to all types 
of EU environmental legislation. At its heart lies the Marine Strategy Framework Directive 
(MSFD) (2008/56/EC), which aims to achieve ‘Good Environmental Status’ (GES) in Europe’s 
marine waters by 2020. The Directive serves as the environmental pillar of the Union’s 
Integrated Maritime Policy, which in turn seeks to realise the full economic potential of 
European seas in harmony with environmental protection. In addition, the EU framework 
Directive on Maritime Spatial Planning (2014/89/EU) and the Recommendation on Integrated 
Coastal Zone Management lay down ground rules for the governance of human activities in the 
marine and coastal context.  
The MSFD was transposed into the UK legislation via the Marine Strategy Regulations 2010. 
Shortly thereafter, the UK began rolling out its national Marine Strategy. Pursuant to their 
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devolved powers, Scottish Ministers are responsible for implementing the MSFD in Scotland’s 
inshore and offshore regions, with specific powers under the Marine (Scotland) Act 2010 on 
marine planning, licensing, conservation, and enforcement.  
Brexit negotiations will coincide with the review of the first cycle of the MSFD and the launch of 
the policy’s second cycle, which is intended to cover the period 2018-2024. Since the 
environment is a devolved matter, Scotland can decide how best to fill the gap left by Brexit in 
this area. However, Brexit may lead to a reduced impetus for cooperation at the regional and 
sub-regional levels, thus undermining the operationalisation of the ecosystem-based 
management measures foreseen by the MSFD and the Marine Strategy Regulations 2010. At the 
same time, Scotland’s lack of international legal capacity may complicate its attempts at 
coordinating with neighbouring EU Member States. 
Additional implications for Scotland’s marine environment will arise from the UK’s departure 
from the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy (CFP).  The CFP has received warranted criticism for 
being based on false or unrealistic premises vis-à-vis the availability and resilience of fish stocks; 
perpetuating or even aggravating unsustainable management practices; and allowing 
considerable leeway for political interests to dictate questionable management decisions. In 
recent years, however, the EU has made some progress in addressing these shortcomings, 
although there remains room for improvement. Since fisheries are a devolved matter, Brexit 
may enable Scotland to pursue a more ambitious, environmentally-friendly fisheries policy. The 
exercise of Holyrood powers would benefit from a strengthened presence in the international 
fora where fisheries management is debated. Such fora include the Regional Fisheries 
Management Organizations, of which the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) is 
the most prominent. Fisheries constitute an exclusive competence of the Union, and the UK is 
currently participating in NEAFC as an EU Member State. By virtue of their devolved powers, 
Scottish Ministers have been cooperating closely with the European institutions to ensure that 
the interests of Scotland’s fishing industry are reflected in the manner in which the Union 
conducts its external relations. Post-Brexit, the UK will have to apply for individual NEAFC 
membership, and in this context the matter of the protection of specific Scottish interests are 
likely to arise. 
Finally, it is worth noting that Scotland’s island communities are likely to be adversely affected 
by the loss of funding opportunities under the European Structural and Investment Funds, 
including the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund. The special needs of islands have been 
acknowledged as one of the priorities of the EU economic, social and territorial cohesion policy. 
The European Parliament recently adopted a Resolution on the special situation of islands 
which, inter alia, called for the establishment of an EU Strategic Framework that would link up 
and integrate instruments with major territorial impact. It remains to be seen what 
opportunities for funding and institutional support will be made available to Scottish islands 
post-Brexit. 
2.13 Climate change (Annalisa Savaresi) 
The EU has been a key driver of climate change law and policy in the UK. The present EU 
legislative framework consists of three main elements: the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), 
covering emissions from energy intensive industries; legislation addressing emissions not 
covered by the ETS; and measures promoting renewable energy; energy efficiency; and carbon 
capture and storage (CSS). Also this area is therefore characterised by the intersection of all 
types of EU law.  
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The EU ETS is one of the most heavily centralized pieces of EU legislation, attributing a key role 
to EU institutions. Other pieces of EU climate legislation, conversely, afford a higher degree of 
discretion to Member States, setting targets they should meet, or providing tools to aid the 
development and testing of new technologies, but leaving them to determine how to proceed. 
Importantly, the EU is party to international climate treaties and its member States have opted 
to implement their obligations under those treaties jointly. As such, there is a direct link 
between EU member States’ obligations under international law and their obligations under EU 
law. EEA member States have also opted to implement their commitments jointly with the EU 
and have access to funds supporting the development and application of emission reduction 
technologies to varying degrees. 
Under EU law the UK has committed to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions in the non-ETS 
sector by 16% for the period up to 2020, with a target to increase the proportion of renewable 
energy in total energy consumption to 15% by 2020. Around 1,200 UK installations are included 
in the EU ETS. While EU targets largely align with those adopted in UK legislation, the main 
implication of Brexit is whether the UK will continue to implement its obligations under 
international climate change law jointly with the EU, through schemes that enable integrated 
emission reductions across EU and EEA Member States. Should the UK decide to leave the EU 
ETS, it would have to address the question of how to discontinue membership of the scheme, 
whilst safeguarding the rights of installations presently holding allowances. Another major 
question is whether and how the UK will continue to have access to EU funds to support the 
development and application of emission reduction technologies.  
Pursuant to its devolved powers, the Scottish Parliament has adopted the Climate Change 
(Scotland) Act 2009, committing to annual reductions up to 2050. The EU ETS presently covers 
45% of Scotland’s emissions. Climate action in Scotland has benefited from measures designed 
to achieve the UK renewable energy targets under EU law. However, the UK Government’s 
recent reform of renewable energy subsidies created much uncertainty on the future of this 
sector. Present constitutional arrangements concerning both energy governance and 
international relations limit Scotland’s powers to address this state of affairs. With Brexit, 
Scotland could demand the devolution of further powers over energy and capacity to negotiate 
and conclude international agreements that relate to its devolved powers. Pursuant to these 
powers, Scotland could consider joining the EU ETS autonomously, or explore avenues to 
continue to access EU cooperation programmes. While there are no precedents concerning 
adhesion to the EU ETS by non EEA members, some EU cooperation programmes presently 
already include self-governing territories that are not within the EU, like the Faroe Islands and 
Greenland.  
As far as the allocation of powers within the UK is concerned, implementation of international 
obligations post Brexit will raise questions concerning the role of devolved administrations in 
determining the scope of the UK’s nationally determined contribution (NDC). NDCs contain 
details concerning the actions that each party intends to undertake to contribute to keeping the 
global temperature increase within the two degrees Celsius goal enshrined in the 2015 Paris 
Agreement. While the UK’s NDC is presently bundled with that of the EU, after Brexit the UK will 
have to prepare its own NDC. The process of drafting the UK NDC is likely to raise questions 
about the involvement of devolved administrations in exercising the UK’s regained powers to 
determine climate law and policy. This is likely to be particularly tricky, for example, in relation 
to matters such as renewable energy, where Westminster and Holyrood manifestly have 
different priorities. 
